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European egalitarianism is confirmed by a propensity to agree with gov-
ernment intervention to reduce income inequality. This propensity is driven
by lower educational level, societal dissatisfaction, liberalism, economic anx-
iety, and media exposure. These findings are realized with data from the
fifth round of the European Social Survey. The regression of agreement
propensities on true explanatory values is made possible by correcting for
measurement error in explanatory scores. This resolves two major prob-
lems in propensity regression, i.e. errors in variables and imputation errors.
These resolutions are attained by a pure randomization theory that places
fixed measurement error in randomization-based regression. This type of re-
gression (versus model-based regression) is used by statistical agencies and
polling organizations for sampling large populations.
keywords: Likert agreement propensity, coefficient alpha, European Social
Survey, real-valued measurement error, randomization theory, true-value re-
gression
1 New Looks at Unresolved Issues
1.1 Research Questions and Survey Data
Income inequality, a perennial problem for capitalist economies, has now become a global
issue. Aly (2011) views this inequality as the major causal factor in the 2011 Arab Spring
and the 2011 Occupy Wall Street demonstrations in the United States. In 2012 the
latter movement has morphed into the 99 Percent Spring, protesting the fact that 1% of
Americans earn 21% of all U.S. income (Collins, 2012). Skewed and high-variance income
distributions are long standing topics treated in the classic economics text by Samuelson
and Nordhaus (1985). They warn (p. 47) that the invisible hand of market economies
leads to income distributions that ”may be unacceptable to voters.” They assume that a
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fundamental function of government is to correct market economies through ”techniques
such as income redistribution to reflect society’s concerns for the poor or hapless.” They
continue (p. 50):
Let’s say that voters through Congress decide to reduce income inequality.
What tools could Congress use? First, it could engage in progressive taxation,
taxing a larger fraction of incomes of rich than of poor. . . . Second, because
low tax rates cannot help those who have no incomes at all, governments have
in recent decades built up a system of income support: aid for the elderly,
blind, disabled, and those with dependent children, as well as unemployment
insurance for the jobless. ... And, finally, governments sometimes subsidize
consumption of low income groups by providing food stamps, subsidized
medical care, and low-cost housing.
In this well-known economic discourse terms like ”unacceptable to voters”, ”voters de-
cide”, and ”society’s concerns for the poor” beg the following questions:
• What is the public attitude toward government intervention to reduce income
inequality?
• What are the factors that drive this attitude?
The present paper addresses these questions with recent data from the European Social
Survey (Fitzgerald, 2012).
The European Social Survey (the ESS) is an academically-driven social sur-
vey designed to chart and explain the interaction between Europe’s changing
institutions and the attitudes, beliefs and behaviour patterns of its diverse
populations. . . . the survey covers more than thirty nations and employes
the most rigorous methodologies. A repeat cross-sectional survey, it has
been funded through the European Commission’s Framework Programmes,
the European Science Foundation and national funding bodies in each coun-
try. . . . The ESS is also among the first social science projects to receive
funding to support its infrastructure. In 2005 the ESS was awarded Eu-
rope’s top annual science award, the Descartes prize. The ESS has also been
nominated by ESFRI as a possible future European Research Infrastructure
Consortium. In 2007, funding was awarded to the ESS Preparatory Phase
Project to prepare for possible selection as a European Research consortium
infrastructure by 2013.
The quality and prospects of the ESS position it as a spatial and temporal baseline
for investigating public opinion about income inequality–spatial because Europe is a
demonstrable egalitarian criterion for other regions of the world (cf. Sections 6.4 and7.1),
and temporal because upcoming ESS rounds will monitor change in this public attitude.
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1.2 True-value Regression of Public Opinion
Addressing public opinion about income redistribution requires cross-national survey
data of the kind collected by the ESS. However, attitudinal constructs scored from these
data inevitably contain error. Thus the survey analyst has an uncomfortable choice:
a) Deny this error and proceed with traditional randomization-based regression used in
government agencies and opinion polling, or b) Declare this error to be random with an
unfounded distribution and proceed with the traditional model-based regression common
in academia.
Here this choice is circumvented by the placement of real-valued measurement errors
into randomization-based regression (cf. Bechtel, 2010, Bechtel, 2011, Bechtel, 2012a,
Bechtel, 2012b). We treat the propensity to agree with a Likert attitude item (about
income redistribution) as taking continuous values on an interval scale. An individual’s
coded degree of agreement, or imputation (in the case of item non-response), is inter-
preted as her (his) propensity to agree plus a fixed measurement error. Each respon-
dent’s explanatory score is also interpreted as a true interval-scale value plus a fixed
error score. Then, the classical assumptions about measurement error (Bound et al.,
2001, Gulliksen, 1950), along with reliability coefficient alpha in psychological test the-
ory (Cronbach, 1951, Lord and Novick, 1968, Nunnally and Bernstein, 1994, StataCorp,
2011), allow the regression of agreement propensities on true explanatory values that a)
have been cleansed of error and b) share our common interval scale.
This treatment of errors-in-variables avoids likelihood maximization and its premise
that a census of survey scores is sampled from a ”superpopulation” with a specified
distribution (Chaudhuri and Stenger, 2005, Skinner et al., 1989). We also shun the
further assumption in model-based theory that true explanatory values are normally
distributed (Bound et al., 2001). Here these true values, and their observed scores, are
not distributed at all.
This nonparametric approach to errors-in-variables also avoids the assumption in
randomization-based theory that observations are constant and without error (Bellhouse,
1988, Chaudhuri and Stenger, 2005, Lehmann, 1999, Lohr, 2010, Nathan, 1988, Skinner
et al., 1989, Valliant et al., 1999). Here real-valued (rather than random-valued) errors
preserve and generalize randomization theory by keeping an individual’s sample inclu-
sion (or not) as her (his) only random variable. This generalization enhances statistical
practice with opinion items and scores that are inevitably laden with measurement error.
1.3 The Plan of the Paper
Sections 2 and 3 describe the measurement errors in our Likert attitude score and its
hypothesized explanatory scores. Section 4 distinguishes a census of these scores from
a population of agreement propensities and true predictor values. This defines true re-
gression slopes in terms of estimable census totals. Horvitz-Thompson-type estimates of
these totals form our estimated true slopes in Section 5. In Section 6 these estimated
slopes confirm our hypothesized effects on European attitudes toward income redistribu-
tion. Section 7 argues that European egalitarianism sets a standard for the world-wide
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reduction of income inequality. It also argues that public opinion about this inequality is
realistically monitored with true-value regressions of micro data collected by statistical
agencies and polling organizations.
2 The Likert Item on Income Inequality
The following ESS item (Fitzgerald, 2012) measures opinion about government action
on income inequality: The government should take measures to reduce differences in
income levels.
Disagree Agree
Strongly 0 Disagree 2.5 Neither 5 Agree 7.5 Strongly 10
We code responses on this Likert scale in equal steps between zero and ten. Missing
responses are filled in as imputations that lie among these five coded values. Letting Yi
be individual i’s response or imputation, we deconstruct it as
Yi = ηi + Ei (1)
where ηi is an agreement propensity and Ei is a coding or imputation error in measuring
this propensity. The values ηi and Ei lie on a continuous interval scale whose origin and
unit are set by the coding of the Likert response labels. Thus, measurement error on
this scale is the departure of a coded response value (e.g. Yi = 7.5) or imputation from
i’s propensity ηi. The items used for imputing missing responses in the present study
are exhibited in Table 2. The regression imputation procedure is described in Section
6.3.
3 Hypothesized Explanatory Scales
Table 1 exhibits five survey scales hypothesized to affect the public attitude toward in-
come redistribution. Each hypothesis is justified at the beginning of each of the following
five subsections. In order to compare the regression effects of these scales, responses to
the items in each explanatory scale are coded between 0 and 10 (like the Likert scale
options in Section 2).
3.1 Societal Dissatisfaction (or Anger about Inequality)
The first personal implication of institutionalized income inequality is dissatisfaction
with a nation’s economy, government, and democratic process. As noted in Section 1.1,
Aly (2011) views anger about this inequality as the major cause of the Arab Spring
and the 99 Percent Spring, the latter protesting the fact that 1% of Americans earn
21% of all U.S. income (Collins, 2012). We measure this personal dissatisfaction by the
following coded (or imputed) responses:
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Xi11 = τi1 + Ui11 (the state of the economy),
Xi12 = τi1 + Ui12 (the way government is doing its job),
Xi13 = τi1 + Ui13 (the way democracy works).
The interval-scale value τi1 is individual i’s true societal satisfaction. The origin and
unit of this scale are set by coding extremely dissatisfied as 0 and extremely satisfied as
10. The difference Ui1m = Xi1m − τi1 for m = 1, 2, 3 is a coding or imputation error in
measuring i’s satisfaction by item m. Averaging over these three items gives individual
i’s satisfaction score as
Xi1 =
Xi11 +Xi12 +Xi13
3
= τi1 +
Ui11 + Ui12 + Ui13
3
= τi1 + Ui1. (2)
The Ui1 in (2) is individual i’s error score, which can be a mixture of item coding and
imputation errors.
3.2 Economic Anxiety (or Fear of No Money)
The second personal implication of income inequality is the anxiety associated with
loss of one’s income and purchasing power. Bechtel(2012b) has demonstrated that the
economic anxiety accompanying this loss has a strong negative impact on consumer
spending, which is the major factor in a nation’s gross domestic product. It follows
that economic anxiety will drive agreement with the Likert item in Section 2. We write
respondent i’s coded ratings/imputations for our two anxiety items as
Xi21 = τi2 + Ui21 (managing on lower income),
Xi22 = τi2 + Ui22 (drawing on savings or going into debt),
where i’s true anxiety τi2 lies on our common interval scale. We keep the origin and
unit of this anxiety scale the same as those of our satisfaction scale by coding not at all
and a great deal as zero and ten. The error Ui2m for m = 1, 2 is a coding or imputation
error in measuring i’s anxiety by item m. For example, if Ui21 is a coding error, it is
a departure of 0, 1.67, 3.33, 5, 6.67, 8.33, or 10 from τi2 on our anxiety scale. Due to
our interpretation of coding error as measurement error, this scale tolerates the equal
spacing of response codes that is ubiquitous in survey work. Individual i’s anxiety score
is the average of her (his) of two item ratings/imputations, i.e.
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Xi2 =
Xi21 +Xi22
2
= τi2 +
Ui21 + Ui22
2
= τi2 + Ui2, (3)
where Ui2 is an error score in measuring i’s true anxiety τi2.
3.3 Liberalism-Conservatism
Economic liberalism emphasizes that
highly unequal distributions of wealth create sources of power and coercion
that are not constrained by democratic participation or constitutional limits.
In such cases, liberals assert that the state must interfere with the market to
reestablish proper relations between citizens (Wingenbach, 2005, p. 414).
In contrast, economic conservatism is
committed not only to fiscal prudence but also to ”small government” . . . and
minimal interference with the operation of private markets.. . . pure capitalism
will always outperform, both absolutely and morally, regulated markets.
The institutional argument, best seen in the work of F. A. Hayek (1976),
involves the claim that governments simply are not suited to engage in eco-
nomic calculation on a large scale.
. . . In fact, when the state interferes to change distributive patterns it is acting
unjustly, since it is coercing individuals who have done nothing wrong to help
some other group of individuals, an act that is clearly immoral (Wingenbach,
2005, pp. 420-421).
The endorsement of laissez faire economics, and its market induced inequality, compels
strong disagreement with the Likert item in Section 2. Economic liberalism, on the other
hand, conveys strong agreement with this item.
The third explanatory scale in Table 1 captures the laissez-faire attitude at its ”right”
pole and the liberal attitude at its ”left” pole. We deconstruct erroneous ratings/imputations
for this left-right item as
Xi3 = τi3 + Ui3. (4)
Respondent i’s true value τi3 again lies on our common interval scale with origin and
unit set by the response coding in Table 1. The departure of Xi3 from this true value is
a coding or imputation error in measuring i’s liberal or conservative orientation.
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3.4 Media Exposure
As Norpoth (2005, p. 174) notes, ”News about the overall economy is something where
the public would seem to depend on the mass media for information and interpretation”.
This dependency, along with European egalitarianism, implies our fourth hypothesis that
media exposure facilitates agreement with government-induced redistribution of income.
We decompose the fourth item in Table 1 as
Xi4 = τi4 + Ui4, (5)
where τi4 is individual i’s true exposure to TV news and commentary, and Ui4 is an error
in measuring her (his) exposure by this survey item.
3.5 Education
It is well established that education is strong causal factor in income level (CollegeBoard,
2010). Moreover, To´th and Keller (2011) find an individual’s redistributive preference to
be negatively related to her (his) personal material status. These two relationships imply
that the more educated tend to disagree with income redistribution. This hypothesis is
supported by To´th and Keller in their pan-European regression of individual-level data
from the 2009 Eurobarometer. We reconfirm it here in our pan-European regression of
individual-level data from the 2010 ESS. This negative relationship between education
and redistributive preference looms as an impediment to alleviating income inequality
because government policy is heavily influenced by the more educated. In Table 1 years
of education is calibrated on our common interval scale by coding respondents with the
least and most education as zero and ten. Respondent i’s coded years of education
Xi5 = τi5, (6)
because this survey variable is without measurement error, i.e. Ui5 = 0. In the present
study we regard our education variable as a proxy for aﬄuence.
4 Item Census, Score Census, and Population
We now posit a hypothetical (but possible) census of the inequality item in Section 2,
the eight explanatory items in Table 1, and the nine imputation items in Table 2. In
this item census missing responses for income redistribution and its eight explanatory
items are (assumed to be) imputed in the same manner as their sample imputations
described in Section 6.3. Equations (1) through (6) map our imputed 9-item census
onto the 6-score census {Yi Xi1 Xi2 Xi3 Xi4 τi5 | i = 1 . . . N}, where N is the aggregate
population size of the countries listed in Section 6.1 (cf. Bechtel, 2010, Bechtel, 2011,
Bechtel, 2012a, Bechtel, 2012b). In this census the score Yi in (1), along with the scores
Xi1 Xi2 Xi3 Xi4 and τi5 in (2) through (6) are constants for the i-th individual. These
fixed census scores are in keeping with the fact that a census is only conducted once.
It follows that i’s six error scores in {Ei Ui1 Ui2 Ui3 Ui4 0 | i = 1 . . . N} are also fixed
because they are differences between i’s census scores and true values in the population
{ηi τi1 τi2 τi3 τi4 τi5 | i = 1 . . . N}.
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Table 1: Items in the Explanatory Scales
Construct Error Sum of Squares
Societal satisfaction d1
The present state of your country’s economy.
The way your countrys government is doing its job.
The way democracy works in your country’s.
Extremely Extremely
dissatisfied 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 satisfied
Economic anxiety d2
Manage on a lower household income in the last 3 years.
Draw on my savings or get into debt
to cover ordinary living expenses in the last 3 years.
Not A great
at all 0 1.67 3.33 5 6.67 8.33 10 deal
Liberalism-Conservatism d3
In politics where would you place yourself
on the following scale?
Left 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Right
Media exposure d4
Your weekday time watching television news,
politics, and current affairs.
Zero < 12
1
2 -1 1-1
1
2 1
1
2 -2 2-2
1
2 2
1
2 -3 > 3 hours
0 1.43 2.86 4.29 5.71 7.14 8.57 10
Years of education 0
Least 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Most
Note: The items in this table are adapted from Fitzgerald (2012).
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Table 2: Items used for Regression Imputation
How much weekday time do you spend listening to radio news, politics,
and current affairs?
How much weekday time do you spend reading newspapers about politics
and current affairs?
Did you vote in the last [country] national election in [month, year]?
Is there a particular political party you feel closer to than all the other parties?
Are you a member of any political party?
Gender
Age
Total household income, after tax and compulsory deductions, from all sources
How do you feel about your household’s income nowadays?
4.1 Identification of True Regression Slopes
Our fixed measurement errors allow a generalization of randomization-based regression
by replacing the census {Yi Xi1 Xi2 Xi3 Xi4 τi5 | i = 1 . . . N} with the population
{ηi τi1 τi2 τi3 τi4 τi5 | i = 1 . . . N}. Then, linearly deconstructing our propensity ηi gives
the set of equations
{ηi = β0 + β1τi1 + β2τi2 + β3τi3 + β4τi4 + β5τi5 + i | i = 1 . . . N}, (7)
where the i are fixed specification errors. Requiring Σi
2 over i = 1 . . . N to be minimal
identifies the true-slope vector β = (β1 . . . β5)
T as
β = [Σ(τi − τ.)(τi − τ.)T ]−1Σ(τi − τ.)(ηi − η.), (8)
where τi = (τi1 . . . τi5)
T , τ. = (τ.1 . . . τ.5)
T , and the two population totals also run over
i = 1 . . . N.
4.2 The Classical Measurement-Error Assumptions
We assume that error scores in the set {Ei Ui1 Ui2 Ui3 Ui4 0 | i = 1 . . . N} sum to
zero over i = 1 . . . N, are uncorrelated with true scores, and are uncorrelated with each
other (cf. Bound et al. 2001, Gulliksen 1950). These assumptions may be written as the
vanishing totals
ΣEi = ΣEiτij = ΣEiUij = ΣUij = ΣUijτij = ΣUijτik = ΣUikτij = ΣUijUik = ΣUijηi = 0,
(9)
where the explanatory variables j, k = 1 . . . 5. It is noteworthy that ΣEiηi 6= 0 is allowed
in true-value regression theory, i.e. measurement errors in the response variable may be
correlated with their true values.
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4.3 Census-Estimable True Slopes
Under equations (1) through (9) it is easily shown that
Στijηi = ΣXijYi, (10a)
Στijτik = ΣXijXik for j 6= k, and (10b)
Στ2ij = ΣX
2
ij − ΣU2ij for j = k. (10c)
Our population target (8) may then be written in the estimable form
β = [Σ(Xi −X.)(Xi −X.)T −∆]−1Σ(Xi −X.)(Yi − Y.), (11)
where Xi = (Xi1 . . . Xi5)
T and X. = (X.1 . . . X.5)
T . Again the two census totals run over
i = 1 . . . N. In (11) the matrix ∆ = diag(δ1, δ2, δ3, δ4, 0), where
δj = ΣU
2
ij = (1− αj)
{
ΣX2ij −
(ΣXij)
2
N
}
(12)
for j = 1 . . . 5. The diagonal δ5 = 0 because years of education Xi5 = τi5 is error-free with
Ui5 = 0 and reliability α5 = 1. The census reliability coefficients α1 and α2 for satisfaction
and anxiety are defined by the well-known formula (A.1) in the Appendix (cf. Bechtel
2010, Cronbach 1951, Lord and Novick 1968, Nunnally and Bernstein 1994, StataCorp
2011). These alpha coefficients provide the error sums of squares δ1 and δ2, which follow
from (A.2) in the Appendix. Finally, δ3 and δ4 are given by our assumptions that
α3 = α4 = .7 for the single- item scores of liberalism-conservatism and media influence.
4.4 The Sufficiency of One Census
Assume a distinct error set {Ei Ui1 Ui2 Ui3 Ui4 0 | i = 1 . . . N} that satisfies (9). Substi-
tuting these new errors into (1) to (6) generates a second score census {Yi Xi1 Xi2 Xi3 Xi4
τi5 | i = 1 . . . N} from our population {ηi τi1 τi2 τi3 τi4 τi5 | i = 1 . . . N}. These new
census scores satisfy (10a), (10b), and (10c) and again generate the same true β in (8)
and (11). Hence, one census is sufficient. There is no need to entertain a second census
or a super-population of censuses. Nor is it necessary to regard measurement error as a
random variable that takes values (within each individual) over different census realiza-
tions from this super-population. Fixed individual measurement errors in (1) through
(6) maintain a pure randomization theory in which the inclusion (or not) of individual
i = 1, . . . , N in a census sample is her (his) only random variable.
5 Estimation of the True Slopes
We regard responses to the items in Sections 2 and 3 to be sampled from the item
census posited in Section 4. Due to unit non-response, this sample of size n reduces to
a net sample of size r < n. Like the mapping of the item census onto the score census
in Section 4, equations (1) to (6) map our 9-item sample onto a 6-score net sample
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{Yi Xi1 Xi2 Xi3 Xi4 τi5 | i = 1 . . . r}. This net sample is drawn from the 6-score census
{Yi Xi1 Xi2 Xi3 Xi4 τi5 | i = 1 . . . N}, which equations (1) to (6) link to our population
{ηi τi1 τi2 τi3 τi4 τi5 | i = 1 . . . N}. Our net sample {Yi Xi1 Xi2 Xi3 Xi4 τi5 | i = 1 . . . r}
may now be mapped onto
B =
[
Σwi(Xi −X.)(Xi −X.)T −D
]−1
Σwi(Xi −X.)(Yi − Y.), (13)
which is a Horvitz-Thompson type estimator of the mapping β of {ηi τi1 τi2 τi3 τi4 τi5 |
i = 1 . . . N} in (8). The euroweight wi in (13) is described in Section 6.2. This weight
adjusts our micro European data for each respondent’s sample inclusion probability, each
country’s population size, and each country’s unit non-response (Bechtel, 2011). The two
net sample totals in (13) run over i = 1 . . . r, and the matrix D = diag(d1, d2, d3, d4, 0),
where
dj = (1− aj)
{
ΣwiX
2
ij −
(ΣwiXij)
2
Σwi
}
(14)
for j = 1 . . . 5. The diagonal d5 = 0 because the reliability a5 = 1 for our errorless
variable years of education. Diagonals d1 and d2 are estimated sums of squares for
measurement error in our satisfaction and anxiety scores. They are computed using
reliability estimates a1 and a2 given by formula (A.3) in the Appendix. Diagonals
d3 and d4 are obtained by setting a3 = a4 = .7, which is our assumed reliability of
the single-item scores for liberalism-conservatism and media influence. Our five alpha
coefficients are exhibited in Table 3. The matrix D in (13) corrects the randomization-
based regression formula, which holds when D = 0 (Chaudhuri and Stenger, 2005,
Godambe and Thompson, 2009, Lohr, 2010, Nathan, 1988, Opsomer, 2009, StataCorp,
2011). The weighted net sample totals in (13) and (14) are HT-type estimates of the
corresponding census totals in (11) and (12). Finally, formulas for the standard errors
of our true-value regression slopes are found in the Appendix of Bechtel (2010). The
fourth line in Table 3 displays the five estimated standard errors of B1 . . . B5 in B in
(13).
6 European opinion about income redistribution
6.1 The ESS dataset
In the European Social Survey (Fitzgerald, 2012)
Data collection takes place every two years, by means of face to face inter-
views of around an hour in duration . . . . The questionnaire consists of a ’core’
module lasting about half an hour which remains relatively constant from
round to round . . . . the core module aims . . . . to monitor change and con-
tinuity in a wide range of socio-economic, socio-political, socio-psychological
and socio-demographic variables.
The present study uses the 17 ESS items in Tables 1 and 2, along with the income
inequality item in Section 2. These items were administered in round 5 of the ESS
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during the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2008 and the lead-up to the present
Euro Zone crisis. Our pan-European sample includes the following 18 countries: Great
Britain, The Netherlands, Belgium, France, Spain, Portugal, Germany, Switzerland,
Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Estonia, The Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary,
Slovenia and Bulgaria. In each country a representative probability sample was drawn
from the residential population aged 15 and older. Thus, our cross-national dataset is a
stratified sample (without replacement) in which each country is a stratum.
6.2 Unit Non-response: A Weighting-class Adjustment
The ESS provides design weights and population size weights that give euroweights
representative of the national populations in our sample. The design weight for individual
i is the rescaled inverse of her (his) sample inclusion probability. These design weights
are normed to sum to each country’s net sample size. A country’s population size weight
is
(country′s population size aged ≥ 15)
(country′s net sample size ∗ 10000) .
Then
wi ≡ euroweighti = (design weighti) ∗ (country′s population size weight) (15)
insures that our weighted regression in Table 3 represents a country in proportion to
its population size. Bechtel (2011) shows that this euroweight is also a normed ESS
sampling weight that has undergone a weighting-class adjustment for unit non-response
(Lohr, 2010). The weighting classes for this adjustment are the 18 countries in our
pan-European survey.
6.3 Item Non-response: Regression Imputation
Procedure. Nine regression imputations filled in missing data for the Likert item in
Section 2 and its eight explanatory items in Table 1 (Lohr, 2010, StataCorp, 2011). First,
one imputation was run for our income-redistribution item and each single-item scale
in Table 1. Each of these four single items was regressed on the nine items in Table 2.
Second, two imputations were carried out for our anxiety scale, with each item regressed
on the other, along with the items in Table 2. Finally, three regression imputations
were required for our satisfaction scale. Each item was regressed on the other two items
making up this scale, as well as on the items in Table 2. These imputations prevented
data loss by preserving 100% of the r = 34085 cases in our net sample.
Rationale. The imputation of missing census data in Section 4 is assumed to mimic
the imputation of missing sample ratings just described (cf. Bechtel, 2010, Bechtel,
2011, Bechtel, 2012a, Bechtel, 2012b). Thus each of our sample imputations closely
estimates its corresponding census imputation which is hypothetically carried out over
the larger census dataset. For example, in equation (2) if Xi11 is an imputed economic
satisfaction, it is a weighted sum of individual i’s rated governmental and democratic
satisfactions as well as her (his) responses to the nine items in Table 2. Due to our
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large sample, the eleven weights in this sum are extremely close to those obtained from
the even larger census imputation. Because these similar census weights are applied
to i’s same governmental and democratic satisfactions, along with her (his) same other
nine responses, the census imputation of i’s economic satisfaction closely approximates
our sample imputation Xi11. Hence, individual i’s societal satisfaction score Xi1 in
(2), which is the average of her (his) two item scores and one item imputation, differs
negligibly from her (his) census score on this construct. These score differences will
(approximately) sum to zero over a large sample. Therefore, our weighted totals using
sample imputations in formulas (13) and (14) are almost identical to those that would
be obtained had we been able to draw census imputations in our sample.
6.4 Macro Attitude toward Income Redistribution
True value theory enables inference to the population mean propensity as well as to
population regression coefficients explaining micro propensities. Summing both sides of
(1) over i = 1 . . . N and using ΣEi = 0 gives
ΣYi
N
=
Σηi
N
. (16)
The left side of (16) is an estimable form of the true population mean on the right side.
Our HT-type estimator of this macro attitude is
m =
ΣwiYi
Σwi
, (17)
where the two net sample summations run over i = 1 . . . r, and wi is the euroweight
in (15). This macro agreement propensity, which is 7.17 on the common interval scale
described in Sections 2 and 3, shows pan-European endorsement of income redistribution.
This egalitarian European attitude stands in sharp contrast to recent polling results
in the United States. Less than fifty percent of Americans favor income redistribution
(Jacobe 2008, Saad 2011). Other surveys show that ”the gap between the rich and
poor” is rated near the bottom of lists of national problems presented to American
respondents (Newport 2011, 2012). This opinion data may account for the fact that a
moderator from the Public Broadcasting Service put no question about poverty to either
presidential candidate in their debate on the economy on October 3, 2012. On September
12, 2012 the United States Census Bureau released its report stating that 15% of the
population, or 46.2 million Americans, fall below the poverty line (United States Census
Bureau, 2012). The non-egalitarian American attitude versus the egalitarian European
one reflects actual income inequality in the United States versus Europe. (See Table 4
below.)
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6.5 Micro-Attitude Regressions
We explain European egalitarianism by regressing this propensity over individual Euro-
peans1.
Preparation. The variance inflation factor for each explanatory scale j = 1 . . . 5 in
Table 1 is
V IFj =
1
(1−R2j )
.
R2j is the squared multiple correlation coefficient when scale j is regressed on the other
four scales (StataCorp, 2011). These five V IF values in the first row of Table 3 are all
close to one. Therefore, there is negligible co-linearity among the explanatory variables
in our true-value regression. The second row of Table 3 reveals that our two multiple-
item scores, satisfaction and anxiety, are measured with reliabilities .79 and .77. Years
of education, presumably recalled without error, has reliability 1.00. The remaining
single item scores, liberalism-conservatism and media exposure, are each assumed to be
measured with reliability .70. These computed and assigned alpha coefficients correct
our regression slopes for unreliability in four of the explanatory scales in Table 1. These
slopes, in the third line of Table 3, were computed by formulas (13) and (14) from our net
sample of the 18 countries listed in Section 6.1. The number of cases in this true-value
regression is 34085.
Hypothesis tests. The highly significant regression effects in the third line of Table
3 confirm all five hypotheses laid out in Section 3 concerning our Likert response and its
explanatory variables. Sections 2 and 3 describe the coding of these variables on the same
interval scale. Therefore, in addition to being tested separately, the five explanatory
variables in Table 1 may also be compared as to their influence on agreement propensity
with income redistribution. Table 3 shows that the strongest effect is exerted by years
of education, which is associated with disapproval of government intervention to reduce
income inequality. This disapproval is also strongly associated with societal satisfaction
and political conservatism. In contrast, economic anxiety and media influence elevate
one’s approval of income redistribution. These cross-national results confirm anecdotal
evidence that the well off would preserve the status quo. In contrast, the dissatisfied,
anxious, and liberal look to their government for relief.
Comparison with traditional regression. The traditional randomization-based
regression slopes are exhibited in the last line of Table 3. The formula for computing
these slopes may be found in Opsomer (2009, p. 7), Godambe and Thompson (2009,
p. 89), and Lohr (2010, p. 442). In Table 3 the errorless predictor years of education
serves as a marker whose coefficient stays (almost) constant between our true-value
and randomization-based regressions. The attenuating effect of measurement error on
the slopes of the erroneous predictors is revealed in the last line of the table. True-
value regression corrects the relative influence of these four psychological predictors in
relation to that of years of education, which is our demographic proxy for aﬄuence.
The standard errors in Table 3 follow the same pattern as their regression slopes. The
1The Stata .do file and documentation for running true-value regression may be obtained by email from
the author.
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traditional standard errors for our psychological predictors are spuriously low because
they fail to allow for measurement errors that inflate coefficient variation.
Table 3: Traditional and True-value Regressions of Attitude toward Income Redistribu-
tion
Explanatory Societal Economic Liberalism Media Years of
variable Satisfaction Anxiety Conservatism Exposure Education
Variance inflation factor 1.10 1.06 1.04 1.00 1.02
Alpha coefficient .79 .77 .70 .70 1.00
True value slope -.284 .086 -.253 .080 -.466
(.017) (.010) (.018) (.018) (.025)
Randomization-based slope -.241 .074 -.187 .054 -.473
(.011) (.007) (.010) (.011) (.025)
Note: The formula for each variance inflation factor is given in Section 6.5.
The alpha coefficients for satisfaction and anxiety are given by formula (A.3) in the
Appendix. Those for the other three single-item scales are assigned. The true-value
regression slopes were computed by formulas (13) and (14). Their standard errors
(in parentheses)were obtained from the iterative procedure given in the Appendix
of Bechtel (2010). The traditional randomization-based slopes and
standard errors were computed from Stata software (StataCorp, 2011)
Limitations of the present analysis. Each of five predictors in Table 3 was put
through a sensitivity analysis called an ”added variable plot” (Graubard and Korn 2009,
pp. 397-419, Mosteller and Tukey 1977, pp. 271-279, StataCorp 2011). This procedure
a) regressed our Likert response in Section 2 on four predictors without the predictor in
question and b) regressed the predictor in question on these same four predictors. The
regression residuals for a) were then plotted against those for b). None of the five plots
(not shown) reveal outlying points that would tend to invalidate our linear model (7).
The plots for economic anxiety and liberalism-conservatism show lowest variation about
their regression lines, i.e. most sensitivity to an individual’s residual error in predicting
her (his) attitude toward income redistribution. However, even these two predictors
have considerable variation about their regression lines. High-variation added variable
plots would appear to characterize public opinion data, where sensitive individual-level
predictors are hard to find. This situation, of course, does not gainsay the usefulness of
survey regressions in diagnosing societal problems and informing public policy.
Finally, we caution that our true-value regression in Table 3 rests on the classical
assumptions about measurement error in Section 4.2. The robustness of true-value
coefficients and standard errors to departures from these assumptions awaits clarification
by future Monte Carlo analyses.
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7 Future Directions
7.1 Can Europe Lead the Way?
This question is answered in the book Why Europe Will Run the 21st Century (Leonard,
2005), which has been summarized by Brookes (2005):
What Europe has, argues Mark Leonard in his provocatively titled book, is
a model, one centered around a new understanding of power and embod-
ied in the institutions and norms of the European Union. The EU exerts
an irresistible attraction on the countries around it, Leonard says, drawing
them into its orbit, embedding them in its legal and economic framework and
changing them from the inside out. Next to this ”transformative power,” the
United States’ military might, which can change regimes but not societies,
and whose application is necessarily fleeting, seems a weak instrument in-
deed. Increasingly, Leonard tells us, we’ll see more regional groupings emerge
bound, as the EU is, by mutual self-interest and common values. It’s in this
sense, he argues, that Europe-or, more precisely, the ”European way”-will
dominate the 21st century.
Evidence that European institutions and norms do guide the 21st century is provided
by the Gini coefficient (Wikipedia, 2012), which is the most widely used measure of in-
come inequality. This coefficient is zero if everyone in a country earns the same income.
It is one if a single person earns all of a nation’s income, with everyone else earning
nothing. Table 4 exhibits the range of Gini coefficients in 2009 for the western market
economies and the developing BRICS nations. The message is clear: Europe sets an
egalitarian standard for the rest of the world. This evidence-based message is reinforced
in Section 6.4, where a mean agreement of 7.17 on our propensity scale gives a solid
European endorsement to government action on income inequality. In Section 6.5 this
propensity is micro-regressed on five explanatory variables. Education, societal satisfac-
tion, and conservatism show the strongest (negative) effects in Table 3, indicating that
the aﬄuent prefer to maintain their privileged situation. In contrast, television has a
positive influence on agreement propensity, suggesting that media news and commentary
can counteract the status quo. Also, those who are anxious about income loss agree with
governmental reduction of income inequality. The specter haunting loss of household in-
come and purchasing power, i.e. unemployment, has been described by Samuelson and
Nordhaus (1985, pp. 207-209):
However large the economic costs of unemployment, a recounting of dol-
lars does not adequately convey the human, social, and psychological toll
that persistent periods of involuntary unemployment bring. . . . recent stud-
ies indicate that unemployment leads to a deterioration of both physical and
psychological health - higher levels of heart disease, alcoholism, and suicide.
. . . other studies indicate that involuntary joblessness is a highly traumatic
event for many people.
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Clearly, reduction of economic anxiety and societal dissatisfaction, through reduction
in income inequality, should be a global goal in the 21st century. Such policy can be
informed by comparing public opinion about inequity in egalitarian Europe with that in
Japan, the United States, and the BRICS nations.
Table 4: Income Inequality in Western and BRICS Economies
European Japan Russia U.S.A. Brazil South
Countries & India & China Africa
Gini coefficient .23-.34 .35-.39 .40-.44 .45-.49 .50-.54 >.60
Note: Each country is within the Gini-coefficient range indicated.
These 2009 data are found in Wikipedia (2012).
7.2 Real-valued (Rather than Random-valued) Measurement Error
Our results have been obtained from a generalization of the orthodox randomization
theory used by statistical agencies and polling organizations. The competition between
randomization theory and model-based theory in societal data analysis has been brisk
and persistent for many years (Bellhouse, 1988, Brewer and Gregoire, 2009, Chaud-
huri and Stenger, 2005, Lohr, 2010, Nathan, 1988, Opsomer, 2009, Skinner et al., 1989,
Thompson, 1997, Valliant et al., 1999). Curiously, despite the continuing use of ran-
domization theory by governments and the survey industry, the academic treatment of
measurement error in survey data has remained model-based (Bound et al., 2001). Re-
cently, Bechtel(2010, 2011, 2012a, 2012b) has attempted to correct this imbalance by
including measurement error in a pure randomization framework.
This inclusion is especially important because (a) opinion polling with micro data has
become a world-wide commercial and governmental activity, and (b) it has long been
known that measurement error attenuates survey regression slopes (Johnston, 1972).
True-value theory corrects these slopes by relaxing the randomization-based assumption
that a finite population is a set of errorless constants (Chaudhuri and Stenger, 2005,
Lehmann, 1999, Lohr, 2010, Nathan, 1988, Opsomer, 2009, Skinner et al., 1989, Thomp-
son, 1997). Here this traditional population is replaced by two finite sets of vectors. The
first set is a population of N true vectors, and the second is a census of N erroneous
vectors. Each of these sets consists of real, rather than random, numbers.
Our use of erroneous real variables avoids the model-based postulate that a census of
scores is sampled from a ”superpopulation” with a specified distribution (Chaudhuri and
Stenger, 2005, Skinner et al., 1989). It also evades the further unrealistic assumption
that our true explanatory values τi1 . . . τi5 are normally distributed (Bound et al., 2001).
Here these true real values, and our real census scores, are not distributed at all. This
nonparametric interpretation of census scores Yi Xi1 . . . Xi5 in (1) to (6) as deviations
from interval-scale values ηi τi1 . . . τi5 is a step forward within the Neyman paradigm
(Bellhouse, 1988, Brewer and Gregoire, 2009, Neyman, 1934, Opsomer, 2009). These
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deviant census scores, which arise from fixed response coding and imputation errors
in (1) to (6), elude extreme interpretations of micro-data as errorless constants on the
one hand or specifically distributed random variables on the other. Then, the classical
assumptions in (9) about our real-valued measurement errors enable the estimation of
the true regression slopes in Table 3 within a pure randomization theory.
Appendix: Census reliability and its estimation
A.1. Coefficient Alpha as the Ratio of True and Observed Variances
Referring to multiple-item scores (2) and (3), along with their component items, we
suppress the subscripts 1 and 2 signifying our first and second explanatory variables. We
then denote item and score variables (which take values over individuals) by suppressing
the subscript i. Thus the variable for an item m is Xm for m = 1, . . . ,M . Its observed
score variable is X, its true score variable is τ , and its error-score variable is U . Also, the
summative (rather than average) score variable is MX (cf. Section 3.1 for M = 3 and
Section 3.2 for M = 2). With this notation the census coefficient alpha for an M-item
score is
α =
M
M − 1
{
1− ΣmV ar(Xm)
V ar(MX)
}
, (A.1)
where the summation (over items) runs over m = 1, . . . ,M (Bechtel, 2010, Cronbach,
1951, Lord and Novick, 1968, Chapter 4, Nunnally and Bernstein, 1994, StataCorp,
2011). The variances in (A.1) are
V ar(Xm) =
{
ΣX2im − (ΣXim)
2
N
}
N
and
V ar(MX) = M2V ar(X) =
M2
{
ΣX2i − (ΣXi)
2
N
}
N
,
where the census summations (over individuals) run over i = 1 . . . N . If the item errors
Uim for m = 1, . . . ,M are uncorrelated (over individuals) with each other and with the
true construct values τi, we show that coefficient alpha is the ratio of the unobserved
true variance to the observed variance of a score variable.
First, as in Sections 3.1 and 3.2, we have Xm = τ + Um and V ar(Xm) = V ar(τ) +
V ar(Um). Letting T = Mτ, V ar(T ) = M
2V ar(τ) so that V ar(Xm) =
V ar(T )
M2
+
V ar(Um). Then the summative score MX = T + MU and V ar(MX) = V ar(T ) +
M2V ar(U). Substituting for V ar(Xm) and V ar(MX) in (A.1) gives
α =
M
M − 1
{
1−
V ar(T )
M + ΣmV ar(Um)
V ar(T ) +M2V ar(U)
}
Finally, writing the number one as
V ar(T ) +M2V ar(U)
V ar(T ) +M2V ar(U)
,
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and noting that M2V ar(U) = ΣmV ar(Um), we have
α =
M
M − 1
{
V ar(T )− V ar(T )M
V ar(T ) +M2V ar(U)
}
=
V ar(T )
V ar(MX)
=
V ar(τ)
V ar(X)
, (A.2)
where
V ar(τ) =
Στ2i − (Στi)
2
N
N
.
Thus, access to this unknown true variance is provided by the observable coefficient
alpha in (A.1), conditioned on the classical error assumptions(Bound et al., 2001, Gul-
liksen, 1950, pp. 4-7, Lord and Novick, 1968, p. 36).
A.2. A Horvitz-Thompson Type Estimator of Alpha
Let V ar denote the sample estimate of a census variance Var. For example, V ar(X) is
an estimate of Var(X). Using this notation the sample coefficient alpha for an M-item
score X is
A =
M
M − 1
{
1− ΣmV ar(Xm)
V ar(MX)
}
, (A.3)
where
V ar(Xm) =
ΣwiX
2
im − (ΣwiXim)
2
Σwi
Σwi
and
V ar(MX) = M2V ar(X) =
M2
{
ΣwiX
2
i − (ΣwiXi)
2
Σwi
}
Σwi
In these estimated variances wi is respondent i’s euroweight in (15), and the summa-
tions over respondents run over i = 1, . . . , r (= the net cross-national sample size). Each
of the weighted net sample totals in (A.3) is a Horvitz-Thompson type estimator of its
corresponding census total in (A.1). Table 3 exhibits the estimated alpha coefficients,
computed by (A.3), for our societal satisfaction and economic anxiety scores (2) and (3).
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